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lthough women have made unprecedented 
headway in the work world over the last 30 years, it 
has been slow going. The pay gap between the sexes 
has narrowed by about a half a cent a year, the decline 
in sex segregation stalled in the 1990s, and women’s 
share of executive jobs has only been inching up. 
In short, equal opportunity remains out of reach for 
most women. 
In the past, discrimination against employed 
women was commonplace. No doubt, several bushels 
full of bad apples still intentionally discriminate, but 
overt, intentional discrimination almost disappeared 
after it was outlawed. Unfortunately, a second type of 
discrimination, one outside the reach of the law, per-
sists across American workplaces. This discrimina-
tion originates in unconscious mental processes that 
systematically distort the way we see other people. In 
order to deal with a constant barrage of stimuli, our 
brains are wired to reﬂexively categorize and stereo-
type people, often in ways that we would consciously 
reject. All but impossible to detect in ourselves, these 
unconscious reactions are normally outside of our 
control. While they are largely invisible, their con-
sequences are not: They systematically disadvantage 
women—and minorities—at work. 
Although individuals cannot banish the automatic 
unconscious distortions that limit women’s careers, 
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through personnel policies that reduce managers’ discretion, 
such as formalizing hiring and promotion practices, holding 
managers accountable for fair decisions, encouraging employees 
to identify with groups in which membership is not associated 
with gender, and actively compensating for unconscious bi-
ases. Many employers would readily implement these reforms 
if they understood the consequences when cognitive errors go 
unchecked. However, most employers do business as usual 
unless something in their external environment forces them to 
change. Until we change the environment in which businesses 
operate, our unconscious biases will block women’s and minori-
ties’ rise to the top.
Automatic stereotyping 
Unconscious distortions harm the career prospects of work-
ing women (and minorities) through stereotyping and ingroup 
favoritism. Stereotypes automatically associate in our minds 
group membership (e.g., male) and traits (e.g., aggressive). 
While most people consciously stereotype some groups (for 
example, the assumption that someone with a youthful or un-
sophisticated appearance lacks savvy about the world, or that 
someone from the South harbors conservative racial attitudes), 
automatic stereotypes occur outside our conscious awareness 
and may involve beliefs that we consciously reject. 
Societies pass on a body of shared cultural “knowledge” to 
their members, and this knowledge includes the content of ste-
reotypes associated with particular groups (e.g., skinheads, fun-
damentalists, immigrants, politicians). As a result, most people 
can accurately describe the content of stereotypes, regardless of 
whether or not they accept them as accurate. And apparently 
simply knowing these stereotypes leads our unconscious minds 
to draw on them, linking group membership with stereotypical 
attributes or behaviors. These automatic implicit associations 
have survival value. Because we cannot consciously consider 
each new bit of information our senses pick up, responding 
without conscious thought to some categories of stimuli (e.g., 
the sudden appearance of a snarling dog or a person who looks 
dangerous) frees up cognitive resources for other tasks. Simi-
larly, automatic stereotypes about the sex or color of a person 
we encounter may help us to quickly size up a situation. Of 
course, to the extent that our stereotypes are not valid, we will 
size it up incorrectly.
The cognitive efﬁciency of automatic stereotyping makes it all 
the more tenacious. We process stereotype-consistent informa-
tion more readily than inconsistent information. And anything 
that taxes our attention—multiple demands, complex tasks, 
time pressures—increases the likelihood of our stereotyping. 
For example, research subjects assigned to complete a sentence 
could obey an instruction to avoid sexist statements when they 
had ample time. But under time pressure (or more generally, 
with multiple cognitive demands), their statements were more 
sexist than those of a control group. The experimenter’s ad-
monition against sexism actually “primed” the subjects’ un-
conscious sexist stereotypes, making them especially likely to 
come to mind. Similarly, we tend to believe and recall evidence 
consistent with our stereotypes (including untrue “evidence”) 
and dismiss evidence that challenges them. Thus, automatic 
cognitive distortion in our evaluation of evidence makes it hard 
for us to sort out valid from mistaken beliefs.
The unconscious beliefs most people harbor about women 
cast doubt on women’s suitability for high-level jobs. For ex-
ample, women are stereotypically viewed as less oriented to their 
careers and more oriented to their families than men are. They 
are also seen as too nurturing to effectively manage subordinates 
or head-to-head competition and too risk-averse to succeed in 
business. Automatic sex stereotypes block women’s access to 
high-level jobs, especially in predominantly male work settings, 
by affecting the tasks supervisors assign to women and men, 
biasing their evaluations, and inﬂuencing the attributions they 
make for the successes and failures of workers of each sex. 
For women who hold or aspire to customarily male positions, 
stereotyping is especially problematic because sex stereotypes 
for women are inconsistent with stereotypes about ideal job 
holders. As a result, predominantly male work settings put 
women in a double-bind. Conforming to societal stereotypes 
about how women should behave prevents their ﬁtting the ste-
reotype of the ideal worker, while satisfying the stereotype of the 
ideal worker violates prescriptive stereotypes about how women 
should behave. For example, Ann Hopkins, who successfully 
sued Price Waterhouse for denying her partnership despite her 
exemplary performance, was described by one partner as “overly 
aggressive, unduly harsh, and difﬁcult to work with,” while 
another encouraged her to adopt a more feminine appearance. 
In sum, Price Waterhouse did not promote her because she 
could not ﬁll the mutually exclusive stereotypes of woman and 
Price Waterhouse partner. 
Ingroup favoritism 
The machinations of our unconscious minds create another 
hurdle for women’s access to top jobs. Within seconds of 
meeting a person, our brains automatically categorize them 
as someone like ourselves (a member of our ingroup; “us”) or 
unlike ourselves (a member of our outgroup; “them”). Like 
stereotyping, automatically categorizing others is functional in 
a complex world. Because we categorize people immediately, 
we do so based on visible, and often surprisingly irrelevant, 
attributes. (People’s inclination to classify all others into in-
groups and outgroups was ﬁrst observed among boys whose 
only visible difference was whether their shirt was red or blue.) 
Thus, whether we view others as “us” or “them” often depends 
on their sex. 
Two processes associated with “us-them” categorization pose 
problems for women’s advancement. First, having categorized 
someone as like or unlike us, we extrapolate to other character-
istics, assuming that ingroup members generally resemble us 
and outgroup members differ. Second, we automatically favor 
ingroup members. We trust them more than other persons, 
attribute positive traits to them while ignoring their negative 
characteristics, prefer to cooperate rather than to compete with 
them, evaluate them more positively than others, cut them more 
slack when their performance falls short, and favor them when 
distributing rewards. 
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In settings in which men hold most top-level positions, in-
group favoritism limits women’s likelihood of advancement. 
The career beneﬁts from belonging to the “old boys’ network” 
involve both conscious and unconscious ingroup favoritism. For 
example, when one female CEO asked her previous boss for 
a promotion, “he looked…ﬂabbergasted” and then explained, 
“The guy I’ve got up there now has been my running partner, 
and it’s taken me two years to get him to that position.” Her 
boss’s explanation suggests that he implicitly assumed that 
someone who shared his gender and interest in running also 
shared his executive ability. In similar situations in which wom-
en who were passed over for promotion sued (for example, Foster 
v. Dalton in 1995 and Brandt v. Shop ’n Save Warehouse Foods 
in 1997), the courts have acknowledged that “such actions are 
unfair from the standpoint of the plaintiff and persons of [their] 
sex,” but concluded that they do not violate antidiscrimination 
laws. Because the courts interpret antidiscrimination law as 
applying only to intentional discrimination, it is legal for men 
to favor their buddies (usually male) over people they don’t 
socialize with (almost all women and people of color).
Another upshot of the assumption that ingroup members 
resemble us and outgroup members don’t is that the latter are 
unlikely to come to mind for career-building opportunities. And 
if they do, they bring the baggage of “themness” with all its 
implicit associations. As another CEO told a researcher, “We 
[had] talked about having a woman [on the bank’s board]…but 
had been unable to settle on someone who we thought could 
make a major contribution.” 
The daily effects of automatic stereotyping and ingroup fa-
voritism may be small: being excluded, passed over, or denied 
credit. But over time, micro acts of unintentional discrimina-
tion lead members of ingroups to accumulate advantages not 
available to outgroup members. The disparities this produces 
are as consequential as those of intentional, overt acts of dis-
crimination.
Stemming discrimination through structure
The unconscious, reﬂexive nature of stereotyping and ingroup 
favoritism makes unequal opportunity for women an every-
day occurrence. But when the laws of nature or of the mind 
lead to predictable, but undesirable outcomes, we often try to 
prevent it ahead of time. For example, because we know that 
automobile accidents can lead to serious injury or death, we 
require manufacturers to install seatbelts. Similarly, to sup-
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press the bias that predictably results from 
automatic cognitive distortions, employers 
need to implement personnel practices that 
are analogous to seatbelts in preventing un-
intended disparate outcomes. 
My favorite example of a preventive struc-
ture comes from a study of how symphony 
orchestras started to include women. Un-
til the 1970s, Claudia Goldin and Cecilia 
Rouse report, virtually all the musicians in 
major symphony orchestras were male. In 
the auditions that symphonies used to se-
lect musicians, judges could see as well as 
hear the candidates. Moreover, the auditions 
were unapologetically subjective: Judges 
were not constrained by prespeciﬁed crite-
ria. And those selected were almost always 
male. We can’t know why this happened, 
but when symphony orchestras began to 
put auditioners behind a screen, thereby 
concealing their sex, symphonies increas-
ingly hired women. The screen both curbed 
intentional discrimination and prevented any 
unconscious stereotypes and ingroup favor-
itism from having discriminatory effects on 
women applicants.
Although there are few settings in which 
applicants’ sex can be concealed, the impact 
of blind auditions illustrates the importance 
of structures for reducing discrimination. 
The subjective and unstructured decision-
making invites bias. Consider Home Depot, which began as 
a close-knit, predominantly male company in which people 
hired or promoted their buddies. The company’s hiring and 
promotions practices remained informal as it expanded, and 
women’s exclusion from management eventuated in a class-
action lawsuit. In keeping with the consent decree that settled 
the lawsuit, Home Depot completely revamped its hiring and 
promotions practices. The new employment structure included 
computer or telephone kiosks in every store for people to apply 
for jobs and specify their qualiﬁcations and job preferences. 
When managers posted openings, they automatically received 
a list of all qualiﬁed applicants. By standardizing all facets of 
the matching process, Home Depot curtailed managers’ dis-
cretion, reducing the likelihood that managers’ conscious or 
unconscious ingroup favoritism or sex stereotypes would affect 
job assignments or promotions. 
Simply reducing managerial discretion by formalizing per-
sonnel practices does not ensure a level playing ﬁeld, however. 
Accountability is another key factor in reducing biases in judg-
ments. Managers must know they will be held accountable for 
the criteria they use, the accuracy of the information they use in 
personnel decisions, the procedures by which they make those 
decisions, and their consequences for gender and race equality. 
For instance, experimental subjects charged with recommend-
ing teaching assistants were less likely to recommend candidates 
of their own race and sex when they had been told that the deci-
sion-making process would be public than when they believed 
their decisions would be kept secret. But, importantly, when 
decision-makers are under time pressure (which is presumably 
most of the time), knowing that they will be held accountable 
does not suppress automatic cognitive biases. For accountability 
to be effective, departing from speciﬁed procedures must have 
tangible consequences. Home Depot, for example, ﬁred manag-
ers who hired staff outside the computerized system. 
Employers can also reduce the discriminatory impact of 
ingroup favoritism by promoting the formation of mixed-sex 
The impetus for change usually comes not from altruism or self-interest but from 
pressure outside the ﬁrm in the form of lawsuits, regulations, or adverse publicity 
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ingroups by employees. One option is integrating work teams, 
thereby encouraging workers to categorize coworkers on bases 
other than their sex, such as teams, projects, or divisions. Orga-
nized competition between work groups, for instance, encour-
ages team-based ingroups, which then discourages stereotyping 
because people tend to see their teammates as individuals.
In sum, micro acts of discrimination occur every day in most 
workplaces as a result of automatic cognitive processes that are 
largely outside of our awareness, much less our conscious con-
trol. The pervasive and automatic nature of these unconscious 
biases makes it almost impossible to prevent their helping men’s 
careers and harming women’s, even when ﬁrms implement 
structures to minimize bias and hold managers accountable for 
using them. This means that ensuring an equal-opportunity 
workplace may require consciously taking gender into account 
in job assignments and promotions. This could take the form 
of gender-conscious recruiting, such as targeting traditionally 
female labor pools or proactively identifying women who are 
likely candidates for advancement; or gender-conscious hiring, 
which explicitly treats sex as a “plus factor” in deciding among 
qualiﬁed applicants. The latter approach is legal only for ﬁrms 
that have admitted past exclusionary treatment (see article on 
page 38). 
External pressure
The raison d’être of work organizations is not to prevent dis-
crimination, but to produce a service or product. And few or-
ganizational leaders, particularly in the private sector, take their 
positions primarily to create a more just society. As a result, 
reducing the discriminatory effect of automatic cognitive errors 
almost always takes a back seat to productivity and the career 
growth of top executives.
Widespread problems within a ﬁrm—such as high turnover 
among women professionals—can lead ﬁrms to change 
their personnel policies (see article on page 42). But 
usually the impetus for change comes from outside the 
firm, in adverse publicity regarding its treatment of 
women or minorities, lawsuits charging discrimination, 
or oversight by regulatory agencies. For example, the   
Ofﬁce for Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs monitors and 
regulates employers’ compliance 
with presidential executive orders 
mandating nondiscrimination and 
afﬁrmative action by federal con-
tractors. Although the likelihood 
of losing a contract is minuscule, 
employees of federal contractors 
look more like America than those 
of noncontractors. Likewise, the 
outcome of discrimination law-
suits can inﬂuence the personnel 
practices not only of the ﬁrm under 
consent decree—like Home De-
pot—but also of other ﬁrms in the 
same industry or labor market. It 
is not easy to prevail in sex discrimination cases, however. Ann 
Hopkins succeeded in her lawsuit against Price Waterhouse 
only because the partners in the ﬁrm expressed conscious sex 
stereotypes. If their decision had been distorted only by their 
unconscious stereotypes, she would not have been able to prove 
sex discrimination.
The legal environment can also make a difference on women’s 
outcomes in more subtle ways. For instance, a study by Doug 
Guthrie and Louise Roth showed that the more equal employ-
ment opportunity laws in a corporation’s home state and the 
more progressive the federal appellate courts in the corpora-
tion’s district, the more likely it was to have a female CEO. 
The policy stance of a region, a state, or a local labor market 
can affect women’s access to top jobs through the message it 
sends to corporations about the consequences of disobeying 
discrimination laws. It can also affect women’s representation 
in the candidate pool by encouraging or discouraging them 
from pursuing opportunities in various kinds of careers. And 
because women, like men, pursue the best jobs open to them, a 
favorable legal and regulatory environment will attract women 
to opportunities. 
The logical conclusion of this analysis—that regulatory agen-
cies should require ﬁrms to curb the consequences of automatic 
stereotyping and ingroup favoritism—is likely to be controver-
sial. But organizations rarely implement genuine reform without 
external pressures; and in the absence of a political sea change 
along with a broader legal conception of discrimination, equal 
opportunity is likely to take place one ﬁrm at a time. Leveling 
the playing ﬁeld more quickly will require pressure on lawmak-
ers and regulators to address both conscious and unconscious 
barriers to women’s inclusion. S
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Testing assumptions
A group of psychologists has 
developed an online test to 
study the prevalence and 
impact of unconscious beliefs 
about stereotyped groups 
such as women, blacks, 
Arabs, the elderly, and the 
overweight. The test shows 
the impact of our own uncon-
scious stereotypes, even 
those we consciously reject as 
untrue. To take the test, visit 
http://implicit.harvard.edu/.
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